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Purifying Japan’s Banks:   
Issues and Implications 
 




 We use a simple real options framework and empirical data to establish that although 
Japanese banks hold borrowers’ shares, their interest is more aligned as a contractual 
claimant than a residual claimant of corporations.  We then explain why the Japanese 
model of corporate governance was useful during the 'catching up' growth  of that 
country's postwar reconstruction decades, but became problematic subsequently. The 
interests of shareholders, creditors, workers, and managers are more readily aligned 
because such growth entails investment in known-technology physical capital-intensive 
projects with highly predictable cash flows. Once on the technological frontier, 'keeping 
up' growth requires risk taking and a tolerance for 'creative destruction'. This is better 
accommodated by entrusting corporate governance to firms' true residual claimants, their 
shareholders.   
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1.   Introduction 
Japan is Asia’s greatest success story, and the first major country outside the West and 
Western colonies of settlement to rank among the world’s richest.  Yet when Admiral 
Perry bombarded Japan  into opening trade with America, its Tokugawa economy was 
mainly traditional agriculture and its society was largely frozen in a feudal caste system.  
How did this stagnant Asian civilizations rise to world economic leadership?   
  Japan’s unique institutions  – its banks,  keiretsu corporate groups, and unique 
governance and employment practices  – are often proposed  as  explanations and  as 
models for other countries.  Yet these institutions are quite recent, having developed only 
in the second half of the 20
th century (Morck and Nakamura, 2005).  Japan arguably 
“caught up” with the West, or at least its poorer regions, long before that – plausibly in 
the early in the 20th century; and did so with an economy of family controlled pyramidal 
groups and conventional labor markets (Morck and Nakamura, 2005).  The institutions 
now associated with Japan are thus mainly of interest in explaining Japan’s most recent 
“catching up” with the West – its reconstruction after World War II.  
  Nonetheless, how Japan’s banks, keiretsu, and other unique institutions of the 
time achieved this feat is still of considerable interest.  In 1945 Japan’s modern 
infrastructure was in ruins and the success of its reconstruction is remarkable. What 
lessons does this era of Japan’s economic history hold for other developing economies?   
  We argue that the governance role Japan gave its great banks was critical to her 
successful and rapid postwar reconstruction.  In a nutshell, this is because banks prefer 
stability and Japan needed economic stability during this period.  However, once the 
“catch up” phase was complete, Japanese banks and their client firms were ill equipped to   2 
participate in “creative destruction” – the turnover of firms that takes place as creative 
new innovators rise and, in so doing, destroy staid older firms.  Bankers unintentionally 
misallocated the savings of middle class Japanese into more of the same kinds of 
investments that would have made perfect sense in the 1950s, but were ill suited to the 
technological developments and markets of the late 20
th century.  As the former sorts of 
investments dried up in the 1980s, bankers’ well-meaning influence over the governance 
of large firms in Japan’s great horizontal keiretsu magnified this misallocation problem 
into a macroeconomic crisis.   
  Japan’s institutions are thus well worth study in any country reconstructing after 
war or another like disaster.  Their usefulness in energizing long-dormant economies is 
unclear, for they never served that purpose in Japan.  Their usefulness to economies 
whose growth opportunities lie mainly on the frontiers of new technology is also unclear, 
for  institutional fault lines  appeared when Japan reached this status, and Japanese 
institutions are now changing.  .   
  Japan’s financial system is opening up and banks’ control over matters outside 
banking is passing.  Traded bonds are now allowed, and other competition from foreign 
capital is displacing banks.  These developments are sensible, and are likely to “purify” 
Japan’s banks  – rendering them “just banks” by undermining their former roles as 
“corporate governance advisors”.   Japan’s academic, political, and business elites now 
realize  the need for another round of institutional  “selective breeding”.  Since the 
Japanese are proven masters at this art, it would be arrogant for outsiders (especially from 
the West) to proffer advice.     3 
  Therefore, this paper focuses on lessons other economies with less successful 
track records at importing and domesticating foreign institutions might  draw from 
Japan’s experience.  Assigning large private sector banks a role in corporate governance 
may well  encourage  “catch up”  development  in a  way that  mitigates  the cultural 
instability engendered by  institutional transplants.  But banks’ voices in corporate 
governance must eventually be muted, for they grow less helpful as the catch up process 
nears completion.   
  Section 2 discusses postwar Japanese institutions in more detail, and section 3 
uses option pricing theory to explain bank governance, how it concords with manager and 
employee governance, and how it jars with growth through creative destruction.  Section 
4 applies this view to the governance of Japanese firms.  Section 5 considers the social 
welfare implications of creditors, employees, and mangers having dominant voices in 
corporate governance.  Section 6 discusses how the advantages of  these sorts of 
governance evaporate as a country approaches the technology frontier.  Section 7 
considers how institutions might evolve to deal with this problem, and  Section  8 
concludes.   
   
 
2.   The Import of Institutions 
 
Institutions are both important and difficult to import.  Few economists now dispute the 
North’s (1990) emphasis on “institutions”, broadly defined as the legal, regulatory, 
religious, and social constraints that guide human behavior.  Unique institutions, to some 
extent, surely do underlie the continued prosperity of the Western World.  Yet Pistor et al.   4 
(2003), Romano (1993), and others show that institutions are also quite difficult to 
transplant, and in foreign soil often either choke or develop into ungainly weeds.    
   One might quip that B uddhism reveres inconsistency as the p ath to 
Enlightenment, and that the Japanese energetically  “zenned” Western imports and 
cherished customs  into  new hybrid institutions that soon became uniquely Japanese. 
However, Japan’s postwar institutions developed haphazardly, as most institutions do.
1   
  The American military government disbanded the great family controlled 
pyramidal corporate groups, or zaibatsu, that dominated Japan’s large corporate sector 
from the late 19
th century until the prewar and wartime militarization of the economy.  By 
1952, when the US occupation ended, Japan’s large corporate sector was a mirror image 
of America’s – large freestanding widely held firms run by professional managers.  Over 
the next two decades, Japanese firms experienced the same governance crises now 
associated with America – hostile takeovers, greenmail, and takeover defenses.  In 
contrast to American firms in the 1980s and 1990s, which relied on poison pills, 
staggered boards, and antitakeover legislation to stymie raiders, Japanese firms in the 
1950s and 1960s used the “keiretsu defense”.  Japan’s great commercial banks helped 
potential target firms swap individually small blocks of shares with each other.  The 
resulting webs of small intercorporate blockholdings accumulated to majority voting 
control in  the formerly vulnerable targets, rendering them immune to hostile takeovers.  
These webs generally connected firms that had been members of the same prewar 
zaibatsu and had retained ties to that group’s main bank.    Freed of shareholder pressure 
(hostile takeovers, greenmail, and the like) and grateful to the bankers who freed them, 
Japan’s corporate managers rebuilt their country.      5 
  But which, if any, of the institutions that emerged from this fracas were really 
essential to Japan’s postwar miracle?  Institution parsing is a useful exercise, but must be 
done carefully.    
  For example,  Japan’s  large banks  played a central role in  creating modern 
institutions.  They continued to intervene in the corporate governance of their client firms 
during much of the postwar period (Kaplan and Minton, 1993), and presumably therefore 
affected capital allocation and economic growth.  Banks and their affiliated insurance 
companies  held  substantial  equity blocks in their client firms during those decades.  
Bankers joined  the boards of troubled companies, and presumably influenced 
governance.  Banks organized many of the great horizontal keiretsu groups and played 
leading roles in all of them.  But how can we distinguish critical institutional architecture 
from historical baggage?  
  Japanese bankers’ professed decisive role in catching up with the West exposed 
them to (probably excessive) derision when the economy faltered in the 1990s. Japanese 
banks were told to divest their shares, keep their noses out of their client firms’ business, 
and deconstruct their keiretsu. Were the banks and the keiretsu mere institutional baggage 
all along? 
  In our view, banks likely played a crucial role helping Japan “catch up” with the 
West after the near complete destruction of its modern physical infrastructure in World 
War II.   But once this was mostly complete, the banks lost their magic because “catching 
up with the West” and “keeping up with the West” present different corporate 
governance challenges.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 This summary is from Morck and Nakamura (2005).     6 
  “Catching up” requires many things, but the most important are probably a 
trustworthy elite, technological skills, and extremely large amounts of capital.  Japan’s 
political and economic elites  were seldom accused of the wholesale corruption that 
blights many developing economies.  Japanese students brought foreign technological 
skills home and Japanese universities acquired international status.  And Japanese banks 
placed the country’s national savings at the disposal of largely honest, largely 
technologically competent businesses.   This institutional formula let Japan “catch up”. 
  “Keeping up” requires sustained innovation.  The technology frontier moves 
outward as entrepreneurial firms vie to develop and apply new ideas.  This too requires 
honesty, skill, and large amounts of capital.  But it also requires a tolerance for risk and 
instability.  Schumpeter (1912) describes the outward expansion of technological 
capabilities as a process of “creative destruction”.  Creative entrepreneurs devise new 
products and production techniques.  Many fail, but some succeed dramatically.  In 
succeeding, they destroy established but less innovative firms.  Sustaining this process of 
creative destruction, with all its tendencies towards instability, is perhaps the West’s 
major institutional achievement.  
  Japanese business and political leaders show increasing signs of understanding 
this.  One might quip that, since “creative destruction” and “sustained instability” both 
have Zen like rings, neither is irretrievably alien in Japan.   Japan’s prospects of eventual 
success in “keeping up” are probably good.    
  Many Japanese industries are already enthusiastic participants in the global 
process of creative destruction.  Sony led the world into miniaturized electronics; and 
Japanese automakers reacquainted Detroit with creative destruction.   The great postwar   7 
horizontal keiretsu – Dai Ichi Kangyo, Fuji, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sanwa, Sumitomo, and 
the others  –  in  which bank influence was greatest (Morck and Nakamura, 1999), 
essentially rebuilt Japan from the ruins of World War II (Johnson, 1982).  Yet Japan’s 
great modern innovators – like Honda, Sony, and Toyota – are, at most, only very loosely 
affiliated with the country’s great banks and horizontal keiretsu.
2   
  In retrospect, this should hardly be surprising.  Bankers rationally dislike risky 
borrowers, and bank influenced firms thus invest in proven technologies with easily 
auditable value as collateral.  Large swathes of Japan’s economy, especially the  large 
firms central to the great horizontal keiretsu, are governed much as bankers everywhere 
would idealize good governance.  Risk is avoided and assets are made of concrete and 
steel.  At the same time, from  top corporate  executives’ perspective, stable financial 
support is a necessary condition for large-scale investment in  the commercialization of 
proven technologies.  This double alignment of incentives permitted Japan to “catch up”.   
  Success in financing postwar reconstruction  gave the banks great credibility 
(Teranishi, 1995).  This locked in banks’ dominance.  Lobbying by major banks probably 
contributed to Japan’s severe restrictions on the use of traded debt, and to the consequent 
market power of the great keiretsu banks.  Once a firm became dependent on a bank, 
switching to another was rare.  This probably reflected adverse selection problems – other 
bankers wondered why the firm was no longer borrowing from its former bankers and 
suspected hidden financial problems (Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992).  But tacit collusion 
to limit competition cannot be ruled out.   Regardless of its origin, this dependence gave 
                                                                 
2 An issue arises here concerning the definition of keiretsu.  For example, Toyota is listed among Mitsui 
keiretsu firms.  But Toyota also runs its own Toyota keiretsu of auto parts suppliers and other affiliated 
firms. Debates about the proper boundaries of each keiretsu are tangential to this discussion.  What is   8 
bankers substantial influence over the governance of their client firms without 
corresponding exposure to the effects of that influence on those firms’ residual cash 
flows.  Bankers pressed borrower firms to undertake low risk projects and shun high risk 
ones (Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani; 2000).  Soon, bank-dependent firms evolved 
low risk governance cultures that precluded risk-taking ex ante – a logical consequence 
of bank influence over their boards (Morck and Nakamura, 1999).   
  Bank influence over corporate governance was probably important to Japan’s 
success nonetheless.  The resulting stability let Japanese employees and consumers spend 
the past half century buying wholeheartedly into  modern  lifestyles.  Such stability is 
plausibly socially efficient, for employees too dislike risk, especially if large-scale low 
risk-high return investment opportunities existed during post-war reconstruction.
3  
Lifetime employment, though never as pervasive as some Japan enthusiasts alleged, was 
not uncommon (Lincoln, 1999).  Aggregate supply rose steadily, chasing an even more 
buoyant aggregate demand in a “big push” towards development of the sort modeled by 
Murphy  et al. (1989).  Factory towns prospered,  and  Japanese  consumers developed 
middle class tastes.   These tastes  – especially for democracy and the rule of law  – 
accorded with the agenda of Japan’s postwar political leaders.      
  But once Japan caught up with the West, her banks – like ships suddenly without 
accustomed winds, did not know what to do next.  Further debt financed investment in 
steadily expanding the output of old line industries, instead of being low risk, left banks 
holding huge nonperforming loans (Hanazaki  and Horiuchi, 2000, 2001, 2003).  Yet 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
germane is that Toyota avoids borrowing money from the Mitsui bank and that no bank has significant 
influence over Toyota’s governance.         9 
keiretsu firms with closer main bank ties continued accumulating debts and investing in 
ever more physical capital (Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani; 2000).  The next section 
explores how this came to be.   
 
3.    Putting Growth Options in Perspective 
Firms are legal persons, usually capable of generating wealth, against whom various 
claimants have various rights.  The firm’s employees, managers, and creditors all have 
contractual claims.  These parties are contractual claimants, for their wages, bonuses, 
and interest payment schedules are all set forth in contracts that define the obligations of 
the firm in precise terms.   
  Once the firm has fulfilled those contractual obligations, all additional wealth it 
creates belongs to the firm’s shareholders – its residual claimants.  Residual claimants 
own this unpredictable residual cash flow, and so must be prepared to accept gains or 
losses as the firm’s fate unfolds.  Residual claimants share proportionately in the fruits of 
good firm performance and in the costs of poor performance.  
  Employees, managers, and creditors can  become residual claimants under rare 
circumstances, such as bankruptcies.  In these circumstances, the firm lacks the resources 
to make good on its contractual obligations and contractual claimants, to some extent, 
also share proportionately in the firm’s fate.   
  But empirical evidence  – see e.g. Morck and Nakamura (1999), Morck, 
Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000), and others – shows that in Japan, as elsewhere, banks 
behave primarily as contractual claimants and use such influence as they have to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 This is not dissimilar from Gerschenkron’s (1952) explanation of the role of banks in early German 
industrialization.  These arguments apply more readily to postwar Japan than to previous high growth   10 
maximize the value of their fixed contractual claims, not to share eagerly in the uncertain 
residual claims that customarily flow to shareholders.   It seems likely that Japanese 
managers and employees act similarly, though direct evidence of this is not currently 
available.  Faleye et al. (2005) show empirically how American employees shun acting as 
residual claimants even if they directly own large blocks of stock.  John et al. (2005) 
show the managers of American firms likewise behaving like contractual claimants.    
  Upon reflection, this is sensible, for students of Japan acknowledge the 
importance in postwar Japan of stable wage streams and lifetime employment guarantees 
– essential characteristics of contractual, rather than residual, claims.  Only recently have 
merit-based raises, promotions, and layoffs started to replace rigid seniority based rules 
(Schmidt, 1996).   Likewise, Kubo (2005) shows that director “pay-for-performance” in 
Japan is n ot structured to align directors’ incentives with shareholder wealth.  Japan 
cannot have offered corporate managers solid job and income security while 
simultaneously making them residual claimants in their corporations’ risky residual cash 
flows.  While Japan was “catching up”, this inconsistency could be ignored, for residual 
cash flows grew steadily.  Once Japan “caught up”, her great corporations had to play the 
game of creative destruction.  The increased risk this inflicted on their residual cash flows 
made the contradiction impossible to overlook. 
  How  all  this happened can be illustrated with some simple diagrams of risk 
allocation, as commonly used in the financial economics of risk management.  Figure 1 
shows that, in classical finance theory, a firm should relegate corporate governance to its 
shareholders because only they have a clear interest in maximizing the wealth it creates.   
    
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
episodes.   11 
Figure 1.  Shareholdings as an Option 
The horizontal axis plots the value of the firm and the vertical axis plots the value of 
various claims on the firm.  The value of shareholders’ equity in the firm, E, is zero 
if the firm’s assets are worth D
0 or less, where D
0 is the wealth the firm promised to 
its contractual claimants – its employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors.  The 
value of those claims is D, which rises with the worth of the firm’s assets, W, until 
the later exceeds D





  Figure 1 shows that contractual claimants, like employees, managers, and 
creditors, obtain the full value of their claims, D, as long as the firm generates wealth W = 
D
0.  As long  as  W exceeds D
0 by a safe margin, the contractual claimants see no 
immediate purpose in maximizing it further.  The residual claimants, the shareholders, 
own the remainder of the wealth the firm generates, E = W – D .  Assuming efficient 
markets, the value of the firm to all its stakeholders (contractual and residual claimants) 
is E + D = W.  As long as W >> D
0, maximizing share value is equivalent to maximizing 
firm value.  Consequently, to the extent that the presumptions of neoclassical economic 
apply, letting shareholders govern the firm to maximize their own wealth is economically 
efficient.     12 
  Well known inefficiencies arise if W falls close to D
0. Under those circumstances, 
the firm’s equity value can be thought of as a call option.  A call option is a claim that 
gives its owner the right to buy an underlying asset at a predetermined exercise price, 
regardless of the actual market value of the underlying asset.   The firm’s shareholders 
can buy continued ownership of the firm’s assets by exercising the option:  paying the 
contractual claimants their promised dues.  If the shareholders elect not to make those 
payments, they can walk away, but ownership of the firms’ assets transfers to the 
contractual claimants, who must recoup what they can through bankruptcy procedures.  
The underlying asset of the call option is the firm’s assets, its exercise price is the wealth 
promised the contractual claimants, and to exercise the option is to pay the contractual 
claimants their due.      
 
Figure 2.  Inefficiently Adventurous Governance 
The shareholders, entrusted with corporate governance, rationally undertake a 
project that is most likely to subtract s from the firm’s current worth, W
0, but that 
might add s as well.  The shareholders gain from any upside risk and have little to 
lose from downside risk.    
 
   
  This sets the stage for tragedy if the value of the firm’s assets falls to e.g. W
0, a 
value only slightly greater than  D
0, the wealth due the contractual claimants; Figure 2   13 
illustrates the situation.  In this situation, shareholders rationally undertake inefficiently 
risky strategies because they get any upside, and have little to lose.  That is, if a project 
might generate W
0 + s >> D
0, the shareholders win big.  They might undertake such a 
project even if it has a greater probability of leaving the firm’s assets worth W
0 - s << D
0.  
This lost worth is inconsequential to the shareholders, who really only lose W
0 - D
0 ˜ 0.   
  This sort of inefficient high risk investment plays a role in many  corporate 
governance crises.  For example, American Savings and Loan banks rendered nearly 
bankrupt by interest rate swings associated with high inflation in the 1970s undertook 
numerous high r isk investments, from real estate speculation like the Whitewater 
Development in Arkansas to junk bonds.   If these gambles paid off, the owners of the 
S&L were back in the black.  If they failed, as most did, the banks were near death 
anyway.   
  In general, shareholder value in a limited liability company with debt outstanding 
can be represented as  
 
[1]  E = E(D
0, s),  
 
where ?E/?D
0 < 0 and ?E/?s > 0, with ?
2E/?s?D
0 positive and growing larger  as D
0 
approaches W from below.  That is, all else equal, shareholder value  falls with rising 
nominal debt, but rises as the standard deviation of the firm’s fundamental value rises.  
The latter effect grows stronger as the nominal value of the firm’s debt rises towards the 
firm’s fundamental value.      14 
   The above analysis is a fixture in finance textbooks in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong, and other countries that entrust corporate governance to 
shareholders or their professional fiduciaries.  However, it must be turned on its head to 
be applied to a country like Japan, if banks have a paramount influence in the corporate 
governance of their client firms.   
 
Figure 3. Inefficiently Conservative Governance 
The contractual claimants, entrusted with corporate governance, rationally avoid 
undertaking a project that is most likely to add s to the firm’s current worth, W
0, 
but that might subtract s instead.  They lose from any downside risk and have 















                                                                      Short position in a put option 
 
 




Suppose that a creditor governed firm, initially worth W
0, has a genuine growth 
opportunity: project much more likely to increase the firm’s wealth by s  than to decrease 
it by that amount.  The creditors see no immediate point in undertaking this project 
because W
0currently exceeds D
0, and gain nothing if the firm’s value rises
 by s.  If the   15 
project does lower firm’s worth to W
0 - s , the creditors get only that amount, which is 
less than D
0.   
Figure 3 shows that the creditors’ claim, D, is not a simple option, but rather a 
composite of a sure payment of D
0 and a short position in a put option.  A put option 
gives its owner the right to sell a given underlying asset at a predetermined exercise price.  
Taking a short position in a put option means being the party that stands ready to buy the 
underlying asset on those terms.  The creditors can be thought of as having a sure claim 
of D
0, represented by the horizontal line at D
0, plus a short position in a put option.   This 
means that if the firm’s assets fall below D
0, their claim becomes D
0 less their obligations 
under that put option, which amount equals the value of the firm’s assets.  In other words, 
the creditors pay D
0 to buy the firms assets, worth W < D
0.  This is represented by the 
“hockey stick shaped” line in the lower quadrant of Figure 3.  When this and the 
horizontal line at D
0 are added together, the result is the function D.   
Standard option pricing theory shows the value of a short position in a put option 
to fall as the standard deviation of the value of its underlying asset rises –  see any 
standard reference on options, e.g. Hull and White (1996).  Thus, Figure 3, buttressed by 
more formal mathematical arguments in option pricing theory, demonstrates that 
creditors, entrusted with corporate governance, refuse to implement  economically 
efficient growth opportunities.   
More formally, the value of the creditors’ claims in a limited liability firm is 
 
[2]  D = D
0 - P(D
0, s),  
   16 
where ?P/?D
0 > 0 and ?E/?s > 0, with  ?
2P/?s?D
0 positive and growing larger as D
0 
approaches W from below.  That is, all else equal, the value of the creditors’ claims rises 
with rising nominal debt and with the standard deviation of the firm’s fundamental value.  
The latter effect grows stronger as the nominal value of the firm’s debt rises towards the 
firm’s fundamental value.  
  Of course, these are not the only problems that can arise from entrusting 
corporate governance to either shareholders or creditors.  Either can be incompetent or 
venal.  In either case, powerful individuals can bend corporate policy to suit their own 
wishes.  But the problems outlined above are especially interesting because they arise in 
otherwise well-governed firms.  They result from fully rational and informed behavior, 
and often entail no violation of the law.   
Finally, these are microeconomic effects.  Individual firms, endeavoring to reduce 
risk, might not lead to low risks at the macroeconomic level.  If low risk investments 
prevail throughout an industry, or even the whole corporate sector, productivity and 
overall competitiveness can suffer.  Other countries’ firms, investing in higher risk 
projects can quickly outmatch competitors that play it “too safe”.  This “fallacy of 
composition in risks” means that low risk microeconomic policies can put at risk the 
competitive advantage of an industry, or even a nation.    
 
4.    The Objective Functions of Large Japanese Banks 
Japanese banks hold both equity and debt claims on their client firms.  This gives them 
cause to value both the maximization of firm wealth, since this maximizes the values of   17 
their shares in their client firms, and the curtailment of volatility in the worth of their 
client firms’ assets, since this protects the value of their debt claims.   
This means a Japanese bank’s situation is actually a composite of Figures 2 and 3.  
Suppose the bank owns fraction aE of a firm’s equity and fraction aD of its debt.  The 
value of its total claim, as a function of the firm’s total worth is V = aE · E + aD · D, where 
E and D are the values of the firm’s equity and debt, as shown in Figures 1 through 3.  Figure 4 
illustrates. 
 
Figure 4.  Main Banks’ Combines Stakes in their Client Firms 
The value of a main bank’s claims on a claim firm, of whose equity, E, it owns 
fraction aE, and of whose debt, D, it owns fraction aD.  The vertical axis gauges the 
value of each claim.  The horizontal axis measures the fundamental value of the 


















Whether Japanese banks act more like shareholders or more like creditors is an 
empirical question that depends on the relative values of aE and aD.  If aE is near zero 
and  aD near one, the bank is mainly a shareholder and can be expected to use its   18 
corporate governance sway, obtained by holding aE of the shares, to discourage risk 
taking when the firm’s total worth, W, is not far above the face value of the firm’s debts, 
D
0.   Of course, aE must be large enough to give the bank a dominant voice in corporate 
governance.   
It is possible to estimate aE and aD from readily available financial data, and 
Table 1 displays these estimates for 1985, a year prior to Japan’s most extreme bubble 
economy excesses and the subsequently stuttering economy.  The average Japanese firm 
is 4.23% owned by its main bank and owes 7.27% of its debt to its main bank.  The 
situation is slightly more lopsided for the median firm - 4.48% owned by its main bank 
and owing 11.3% of its debts to its main bank.  This suggests that main banks should be 
two to three times more worried about their client firms’ debt values as opposed to equity 
values.   
 
Table 1.  Main Banks’ Debt and Equity Stakes in Client Firms 
Main banks’ debt stakes are much larger than their equity stakes in their client 
firms, both as percentages of the client firms’ outstanding debt and equity and as 
fractions of the sum of the main bank’s debt and equity holdings. The sample is 322 
large Japanese firms in 1985.  Equity is estimated as the market value of equity in 
1983, before the onset of the bubble economy, and is adjusted using subsequent 











           
Main bank equity as % of total firm equity  aE  4.23  3.10  4.48  9.64 
Main bank debt as % of total firm debt  aD  7.27  3.56  11.3  22.5 
           
           
Main bank equity as % of its claims  ?E  17.4  5.60  11.3  22.5 
Main bank debt as % of its claims  ?D  82.6  77.5  88.7  94.4 
           
Source:  Data from Morck, Shivdasani, and Nakamura (2000).   
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  Thus, a median firm’s main bank has a stake with value of  
 
 
[3]   V = aEE(D
0, s) + aDD
0 – aDP(D
0, s) 
      = 0.113 · D
0 + 0.0448 · E(D
0, s) – 0.113 · P(D
0, s) 
 
  We argued above a main bank’s preferences as to the level of risk in its client 
firms strategies depends on the relative values of aE and aD, its proportional stakes in the 
firm’s equity and debt.  This can now be made more precise.  
  Taking Black Scholes pricing as an approximation for valuing the options in [3] 
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where r is the interest rate, t is the time until the firm’s debt is due, and s is the standard 
deviation of the rate of increase in the firm’s fundamental value.  Given this, [3] becomes  
                                                                 
4 The Black Scholes approach to option pricing is not necessarily valid here, especially as regards the put 
option.  This is because the approach ignores the possibility of early exercise of the option.  That is, it 
assumes that the firm’s debts are all pure discount bonds or loans, with no coupon or periodic interest 
payments.  Default can occur at the maturity of the debt agreements, but never before.  This is clearly not 
realistic, however the simplification does not affect the relationship between s and the value of the main 
bank’s claims.  It is also assumed that all the firm’s debts come due at once.  If the firm has different debt 
contracts with different maturities, the algebra grows more complicated, but the basic intuition remains.   20 
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By substituting [5] into [6] and differentiating, it can be shown that  
 











That is, Japanese banks prefer, all else equal, that their client firms minimize the risk in 
their fundamental values if  aE <  aD.  This condition holds for the typical Japanese 
borrower firm – indeed, it holds for about 61% of our sample client firms for main banks’ 
debt and equity stakes.  This rises to 74% when we aggregate all banks’ debt and equity 
stakes in each borrower firm    
A more natural way to express Japanese banks overall attitude towards risk taking 
by their client firms is to sum the value of the main bank’s debt and equity claims in each 
client firm, and then to ask what fraction of this total reflects equity as opposed to 
creditor interest.  This is done in the lower panel of Table 1.  The average bank has 4.75 
times as much tied up in loans to its client firms as in equity holdings.  For the median 
firm, the ratio is nearly eight times as much debt as equity interest.   
The figures in Table 1 probably understate the lopsided nature of Japanese banks’ 
financial relations with their client firms.  Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991) argue that Japanese 
firm’s main banks, their largest lenders, often offer implicit guarantees to other banks that 
lend to their client firms, and even to bondholders.  This greatly magnifies the bank’s   21 
vulnerability to their client firms’ insolvency.  For example, if we take aE as the main 
bank’s equity stake in a given client firm and aD as all its debts to banks, [7] holds for 
less than 16% of our sample. Japanese banks are not thought to offer any comparable 
implicit promise to augment, or even safeguard, the values of other equity blockholders’ 
investments.   
Japanese main banks, despite owning equity, are likely to use what corporate 
governance suasion they have to protect the value of their claims as creditors.  Their 
interest in their equity holdings is clearly secondary.   
That Japanese banks affect the governance of their client firms seems well 
documented in the literature.  Kaplan and Mitton (1993), Morck and Nakamura (1999), 
and others show that bankers are inserted into the boards of borrower firms’ whose 
performance sags; that is, whose W falls towards their D
0.   
It is far from clear that this influence is to the long run advantage of shareholders, 
for Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000) show that larger bank equity holdings are 
actually associated with lower Tobin’s average  q ratios, although they also detect a 
significant nonlinear trend.  If the bank’s equity stake is very large, bank’s shareholdings 
do become positively related to firm valuation.  Figure 5 summarizes their main result  
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Figure 5.  Main Bank Ownership and Shareholder Value, Pre Bubble 
In 1986, the shareholder value of a typical Japanese firm falls with the ownership 
stake of its main bank if at low levels of main bank ownership, but rises with the 
ownership stake of its main bank at higher levels of main bank ownership.  
Shareholder value is measured as Tobin’s average q, adjusted for real estate and 
cross holdings price inflation.   
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Based on regression 2 from Table 3 in Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000). 
 
 
  Most large Japanese firms fall on the left side of Figure 5.  Morck et al. (2000) 
report that m ain bank ownership averages 3.59%, with a standard deviation of 2.22%.  
However these statistics come from a distribution with a very thin right tail.  Although 
the median of the distribution is 4.18%, the 75
th percentile is 4.99%.  Very few Japanese 
firms have main bank blockholdings larger than 5%.  Japanese banks had historically 
been permitted to hold blocks of their client firms stock as large as 10%.  But the 1977 
Anti Monopoly Act required all banks to reduce their ownership positions to five percent 
or less by April 1, 1987.  Most Japanese banks had already complied by 1986.    23 
Consequently, Figure 5 primarily indicates a negative relationship between main bank 
share ownership and firm value.   
  This is consistent with Japanese banks using the governance voice their equity 
stakes provide primarily to lobby for policies that limit risk-taking even though these 
policies  maximize  neither  shareholder value  nor overall firm value (Hanazaki  and 
Horiuchi, 2000, 2001, 2003).  Reverse causality is unlikely, for when Morck, Nakamura, 
and Shivdasani (2000) repeat their analysis using 1975 main bank ownership to predict 
1985 average q ratios , similar results ensue.   
  McGuire (2002) reports the sensitivity of capital investment to q ratios lesser for 
Japanese firms more dependent on bank financing.  This is consistent with governance in 
these firms having goals other than shareholder value maximization, which  would 
manifest in high q ratios .   
  Japanese banks’ involvement in their client firms’ corporate governance need not 
be entirely inimical to shareholder value.  Morck and Nakamura (1999), again looking at 
1980s data, find that troubled horizontal keiretsu firms’ share prices rise significantly 
when bankers join their boards.  This is consistent with their banks having at least some 
concern for shareholder value.  However, they find an insignificant decline in the values 
of troubled client firms not in horizontal keiretsu when bankers join their boards.  This is 
consistent with horizontal keiretsu member firms having main bank equity blockholdings 
towards the right in Figure 5, and highlights the dual incentives confronting banks.   
  Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) delve further into the influence banks 
exert on the governance of their client firms.  They discover that higher m ain bank 
ownership is associated with higher property, plant, and equipment spending.  This might   24 
be consistent with main banks encouraging their client firms to invest overly heavily in 
collateralizable assets, rather than intangibles like technology or improved flexibility, 
even when investment in intangibles would add more to firm value (Hanazaki  and 
Horiuchi, 2000, 2001, 2003).  Unfortunately, Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) 
do not directly test for a link between bank voice in governance and risk taking. 
 
5.    Macroeconomic Effects of Microeconomic Risk Avoidance 
Society as a whole might prefer firms to adopt strategies that are either more or less risky 
than would maximize shareholder value or firm value.  Economists usually think of social 
welfare as a trade-off between economic efficiency and equality, this might reflect 
debates between liberals and socialists within that profession.  A tradeoff of growth 
against stability might better reflect the polities of many countries, which often contain 
liberal and conservative parties.  However, we argue that this cannot be pressed too far in 
a globalized economy.  If domestic firms avoid risk too thoroughly, the risk falling 
behind their foreign competitors in productivity growth and putting their country’s living 
standard at risk. To see the intuition behind this, consider a good produced by both Japan 
and the rest of the world.  If risk taking raises the productivity of the foreign producers, 
Japanese firms would have to sell their output at a lower price to remain competitive.  
This would require paying their workers less through lower domestic wages.  A 
depreciating exchanger r ate would also work, but that too reduces domestic living 
standards by making imports costlier. In short, excessive microeconomic risk avoidance 
can create macroeconomic risk as the economy is forced to adjust to reduced competitive 
strength.     25 
  Corporate sector employees’ claims against firms are quite similar to those of 
creditors.  Employees, like banks and bondholders, have contractual claims against firms, 
and share little of the upside or downside risk in their firms’ operations.  Falaye et al. 
(2005) examine United States firms in which employee controlled investment funds have 
equity stakes greater than five percent and in which no other blockholder has a larger 
share.  These firms have depressed values and follow decidedly lower risk strategies than 
otherwise comparable control firms with no employee voice in corporate governance.   
Assigning corporate governance powers to either shareholders or creditors might 
actually let a country adjust corporate governance to reflect the risk tolerance of its 
people.   Roe (2003) and,  more explicitly, Claessens and Klapper (2002) propose 
precisely such a policy choice.  The Japanese people - recovering from earthquakes, 
depressions, fascism, nuclear war, and defeat - were probably especially risk averse from 
the late 1940s through the 1960s.  Unsurprisingly, that is when its system of main banks 
and  keiretsu assumed their now familiar economic roles. Giving creditors a role in 
corporate governance may not have reflected a deliberate policy objective of corporate 
governance that avoided risk taking; but the result was probably not unpopular to 
Japanese politicians and voters at the time.   
Blending “catch up” growth with job stability might be politically appealing 
institutional framework for many parts of the current day developing world, even if it 
necessitates further institutional as these countries draw abreast of the developed world.  
Western institutions cannot be transplanted piecemeal into developing countries, and the 
same is surely true of Japan’s unique institutions.   
  However, there are pitfalls in this strategy.     26 
  We have stressed a sort of fallacy of composition.  Banks, intend on promoting 
low risk microeconomic corporate strategies, might inadvertently undermine their client 
firms’ competitive advantage in the global economy and thereby create macroeconomic 
problems, such as low productivity and slow growth.  We believe this to be an important 
factor in Japan’s recent macroeconomic stagnation.   
  Other pitfalls also merit notice.   
  First, banks’ interests, although concordant with employees’ interests as regards 
risk taking, might diverge in other dimensions.  For example, once a client firm is in 
financial distress, the creditors and employees compete for recompense.  Ogawa (2002) 
shows that financially distressed Japanese firms shed jobs in the 1990s; whereas Morck 
and Nakamura (199) find this only for firms outside financial  keiretsu in the 1980s.   
Prolonged financial distress has perhaps made banks less able to accommodate 
employees claims to retain popular support for their voice in corporate governance.   
  Also, Rajan (1992) argues that banks might ‘capture’ their client firms.  Unable to 
switch banks without signaling problems with their credit, borrower firms might be 
trapped into paying above market interest rates.  Consistent with this, Morck, Nakamura, 
and Shivdasani (2000) find that higher main bank ownership is associated with higher 
interest costs per yen of borrowings.  Caves and Uekusa (1976) also show that main 
banks charge their client firms higher than market interest rates, with the premium 
proportional to main bank dependence in horizontal keiretsu firms. Despite these higher 
costs, Nakatani (1984) shows horizontal keiretsu firms to be more leveraged than other 
firms.  Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) discuss how Japanese banks might pressure firms 
whose governance they influence to borrow. All of these results are consistent with main   27 
banks using the governance voice their equity holdings provide to direct their client firms 
to borrow more at higher interest rates.  This might be thought of as a form of tunneling, 
in which banks use their governance influence to extract wealth from their client firms.   
  What gives bankers so much power?  Certainly, firms became locked into 
financing arrangements with their main banks – switching to another could easily have 
been perceived as abandonment by the first, perhaps signaling concealed financial 
trouble.  Certainly, client firms had few alternative sources of financing, given the severe 
constraints on corporate bond flotation in postwar Japan.  Certainly, bankers wielded 
considerable political influence – probably explaining the constraints on corporate bond 
floatation.  But another possibility, implied by John et al. (2005), is that client firm 
managers submitted to bank influence because doing so maximized their utility too.  John 
et al. (2005) show using US data that entrenched top managers behave like contractual 
claimants.  Like banks, they seek to avoid risk to  protect  their  claims on corporate 
resources.      
  This makes the fallacy of composition, alluded to above, even more plausible.  
Top managers of the large firms in Japan’s great financial keiretsu and their main banks 
typically have rather short careers (Kaplan and Minton, 1993; Morck and Nakamura, 
1999).  This might induce a myopia problem.  Even if corporate and bank top executives 
understand that avoiding risk in the short term creates greater danger in the long run, they 
may shun risk nonetheless if their career considerations depend  only on short term 
outcomes.  Bankers and corporate executives may decide to continue eschewing risks as 
long as the long-term costs of this strategy fall due long after their retirement dates.  By   28 
the time those costs become imminent, it may be too late for the cohort of bankers and 
corporate managers who take charge at that time to take corrective actions.   
 
6.    Success Sows Seeds of Failure 
This issue of myopia is actually a broader and more general concern if bankers affect 
their client firms’ governance.  In providing a functional form to the values of the options 
implicit in Japanese banks’ claims against their client firms, [6] requires that we specify a 
maturity date for the client firms’ debts.  This underscores another significant difference 
between shareholders’ and creditors’ claims.  Shareholders’ claims are of indeterminate 
horizon, for they can be though of as valuing an option to buy free and clear ownership of 
the firm’s assets and the cash flows they generate over a theoretically infinite horizon.  
Creditors’ claims, in contrast, are a risk free payment at a predetermined point in time, 
compromised by the possibility that shareholders might leave them with the firm’s assets 
by exercising their option to default.  The major part of the creditors’ claims is thus short-
term claims.  Consequently, creditors might be expected to use such governance voice as 
their shareholdings provide to lobby for strategies beneficial to the firms’ short-term 
prospects, despite those policies inflicting long-term disadvantages.
5    
  Consistent with this, Morck and Nakamura (1999) show that bankers join their 
client firms’ boards when those firms have shortfalls in  current earnings or  current 
liquidity – among the shortest of short-term performance measures. Measures of longer 
term performance are distinctly less useful in predicting bankers joining boards, and thus 
presumably banks’ exercising of their corporate governance voices.     29 
  Catching up with the most advanced economies involves relatively capital intense 
corporate investments with relatively predictable cash flows.  Japan’s postwar 
reconstruction and ‘catching up’ in the subsequent decades involved using existing 
technology to produce copies of goods made elsewhere for sale both in Japan and abroad.  
These sorts of investments are well suited to bank financing.  They involve investment 
primarily in property, plant, and equipment – collateralizable assets  – and generate 
predictable returns suitable for funding interest payments.  In an economy predominated 
by such investments, banks’ focus on generating short term cash flows might incidentally 
generate high growth and rising standards of living.  Creditor myopia would not only 
stabilize the economy, but also direct capital to where it is needed to ‘catch up’ fast.   
  Of course, fundamental asset values occasionally fall below nominal debts owed 
despite firms’ following fairly low risk policies.   Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 
1991) and others show that main banks often  orchestrated bailouts of their distressed 
client firms in such circumstances.  This often involved directing other client firms to buy 
equity in the distressed client. This might explain the positive stock price reaction Morck 
and Nakamura (1999) report around bankers joining their client firms boards, although 
this interpretation suggests that firms whose governance is influenced by their main 
banks, and who consequently participate in such bailouts, should report correspondingly 
reduced performance.    
  Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990)  suggest Japanese main banks do this 
because they make implicit promises to ‘insure’ their client firms’ debts.  That is, main 
banks are  vulnerable not only to put options from shareholders, but other put options 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 The actual situation is probably somewhat more complicated.  Short term bank loans continuously rolled 
over de facto imply long term put options with indefinite maturity, implying that the bank would limit risk-  30 
from other creditors.  This effectively raises the effective value of aD above the main 
bank’s explicit share of the firm’s debts, aggravating the imbalance referred to above.   
  A more profound myopia, alluded to above, plausibly afflicts the top executives 
of the main banks.  These executives often come to top positions near the ends of their 
careers, and retire soon after taking charge.  If they can delay the realization of problems 
at their client firms even a few years, they can bequeath their problems to their successors 
(Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 2000, 2001, 2003).   
  None of this need pose serious problems to the economy as long as an abundance 
of value creating investments remains.  The costs of bailouts to stabilize troubled client 
firms can be spread across financially sounder client firms, and ultimately recouped by 
further profitable, low risk investments.   
  However, Aghion and  Howitt (1992),  Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes 
(2005), Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2005), and others argue that the investments 
underlying ‘catch up’ growth and those required to ‘keep up’ are fundamentally different.  
Keeping up with other rich countries requires risk taking  – investing in unproven 
technologies and  uncertain ventures.  It also requires investing in intangibles, like 
research, process development, and productivity enhancement.  All of this requires a 
degree of instability, for Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2004) link more extensive turnover in 
countries ranks of top corporations with faster productivity growth in high, but not low, 
income countries.  Also, John et al. (2005) and Ofaleye et al. (2005) link low corporate 
risk taking with both low productivity growth and low per capita GDP growth.   
  Japanese firms are clearly capable of  undertaking risky  investments.  Sony, 
Toyota, and Honda lead the world in their respective industries precisely because of their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
taking over the longer term.      31 
skill in choosing such investments.  But these firms are unusual in Japan for their 
remoteness from major banks and their strictly limited use of debt financing.     All three 
were clearly governed through recent decades by entrepreneurial shareholders who, 
except in the case of Toyota, were their firms’ founders.  Such exceptions prove the rule 
that giving banks a dominant voice in corporate governance mixes poorly with 
entrepreneurial risk-taking.  Figure 6 shows that Japan drew  abreast the richest 
countries in the world and then surpassed them in  per capita  GDP, evaluated at 
purchasing power parity, in 1990.  The figure also shows that this year also marks the 
implosion of Japan’s bubble economy.  The arguments above suggest that this is no 
coincidence.   
        32 
Figure 6.  Japan Catches Up with the West 
Japan’s per capita  GDP surpasses the average of the other six countries in the G7 
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  As Japan drew abreast the world’s richest economies in the late 1980s, ‘catch up’ 
investments ran out.  Japanese firms could no longer grow through low risk fixed capital 
intensive investments.  Yet the governance structures of most large Japanese firms, still 
entrusting a commanding voice to banks, encouraged just such investments.  Though 
these traditional investments no longer paid off as before, yet their managers continued 
pouring capital into those investments as their bankers nodded assent.  Japanese 
industries that had prospered almost continually as  the country caught up now found 
themselves in increasingly dire straights.  Value destroying investments depressed the 
fundamental values of many firms towards the nominal values of their debts.  As W fell 
towards D
0, banks would have grown increasingly nervous about risk taking, using their 
governance voices to minimize the put option implicit in their claims by preventing 
radical restructuring or dramatic strategy shifts.  This, of course, only further 
misallocated capital. 
  Japanese investors, accustomed to an abundance of low risk, but financially sound 
investments, continued to save at a high rate and to entrust their savings to the domestic 
financial system.  The stock market and real estate bubbles that ensued, as investment 
managers sought uses within their traditional bounds for the funds at their command 
follow the classic pattern described by Kindelberger (1978), and are discussed in Goyal 
and Yamada (2004) and elsewhere.  Goyal and Yamada (2004) in particular show that 
effervescent share prices probably induced further misallocation of capital during the 
bubble years, for they show substantial equity and convertible debt issues corresponding 
to likely windows of share price excesses.  Thus, years of avoiding microeconomic risks 
triggered macroeconomic instability and then a macroeconomic crisis.     34 
7.  Japan’s Banks Need Purification, Not Just Cleansing 
Friedman and Schwarz (1963), in their Monetary History of the United States, contrast 
that country’s fragmented banks with Canada’s much larger, geographically and 
industrially diversified multibranch banks.  They note that, while waves of bank failures 
paralyzed the American financial system during the Great Depression of the 1930s, no 
single Canadian bank of any importance failed during that decade. This has become a 
traditional argument among American students of bank finance for multibranch banks, 
interstate banking, and the internationalization of banking.   
  However, Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993)  suggest a different lesson.  They 
examine Canadian archival files and show that all major Canadian banks were legally 
insolvent during the Great Depression.  With the blessings of the Canadian government, 
the banks all simply ignored their insolvency and continued as if nothing were wrong.  
Canada emerged from the Depression with all its major banks intact and enjoyed several 
decades of almost continual high growth thereafter.  Perhaps one sensible way to deal 
with a banking crisis really is simply to pretend that it does not exist until it goes away! 
  The Japanese government has tried this “Canadian cure” for over a decade now, 
but another high growth period has not materialized.  There are several reasons for 
doubting that the Canadian approach can work in Japan.  First, the Great Depression was 
almost certainly primarily exogenous to Canada.
6  Trade barriers erected by American 
protectionists were undoubtedly a proximate cause of corporate and industry collapses 
across the country, though speculative excesses in the 1920s bull market clearly led to 
excess c apacity in some industries, such as paper production.  The Canadian 
                                                                 
6 The following is summarized from Bliss (1987).     35 
government’s mercantilist approach to combating deflation – the mandatory cartelization 
of every industry in the country  – also probably made things worse.  But Canada’s banks 
owned no blockholdings in their client firms.  They were purely creditors, but had no 
governance voice of any volume until their client firms actually defaulted, either formally 
or informally, whereupon the banks organized speedy liquidations.  Canadian banks had 
no power to press their solvent client firms to eschew risk or overinvest in collateralizable 
assets.  
  Japan’s  ongoing economic problems, in contrast to the Great Depression in 
Canada, are most probably endogenous.  No foreign influences, like trade barriers or a 
worldwide financial crisis, can be identified as proximate triggers of the 1992 stock and 
real estate price collapses and ensuing banking crisis.  Rather, the arguments above 
suggest that the corporate governance voice Japan’s main banks had previously used to 
influence the governance of many of the country’s great firms was increasingly off-key.   
  Bailouts of some of a bank’s client firms could no longer be financed by other 
client firms, for too many had projects that turned out to be unprofitable.  Yet, Hamao, 
Mei and Xu (2002) show that banks continued their past policies of bailing out troubled 
client firms, especially those in horizontal  keiretsu.  Peek and Rosengreen (2002) 
persuasively argue that Japan’s banking regulations also encouraged such bailouts by 
promoting the evergreening of bad corporate loans; but find this especially true for firms 
in horizontal  keiretsu.  If Hoshi  et al. (1990) are correct that main banks implicitly 
guarantee their client firms’ debts to other creditors, main banks’ implicit put options 
would be most dangerous in those firms, perhaps explaining this favoritism in 
forbearance.  Neither did banks’ and firms’ attempts to compensate with investments in   36 
stocks and real estate pay off.  The central problem, the increasing divergence of banks’ 
natural interests in corporate governance from the corporate strategies needed for 
continued economic growth, requires a different approach to ‘cleaning up’ the banking 
system. 
  The Japanese bank regulators have orchestrated a series of mergers and other 
stabilization programs, discussed by Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) and others.  The banks’ 
major insolvent client firms can be reorganized or liquidated as Japanese laws and 
regulations dictate. However, a “cleansing recession” of the sort described by Caballero 
and Hammour (1994) does not seem to have taken place.  Hamao, Mei, and Xu (2002) 
find that horizontal keiretsu finds share prices display little of the idiosyncratic volatility 
that such a resorting of firms would probably imply.   
  Instead, Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) argue that continued weakness in Japan’s 
banks and in their major client firms creates a self-reinforcing feedback, prolonging 
financial weakness.  They argue that the continued access of many Japanese borrower 
firms to bank credit is a sign of this continued weakness, not of an underlying strength in 
the banking system.  They argue that the banks continued attempts to prop up their most 
important client firms and constrain their liabilities from their put options, shown  in 
Figure 3, leave the economy anematized by legions of “zombie firms”.  This leads to a 
productivity growth collapse without a credit crunch.  Japan’s antirecessionary monetary 
and fiscal policies of low interest rates and expansive deficit spending further worsen this 
problem by transfusing more funds into zombie firms.   
  Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) argue convincingly that various aspects of Japan’s 
banking regulations encourage banks to sustain zombie client firms.  This seems likely,   37 
but the banks’ actual ability to sustain them for so long is remarkable.  The numerous 
perambulating zombie firms, some apparently sustained for well over a decade by special 
access to bank capital,  suggests banks had substantial financial market power.  
Otherwise, it is hard to see how better managed banks could have been restrained from 
driving out worse managed ones.
7   
  The arguments perhaps explains why Japan’s bank regulators are considering both 
increasing competition in banking and muting banks’ voices in their solvent client firms’ 
governance.  Truly cleaning up Japan’s banks requires  more than just eliminating the 
current crop of zombie firms by revising the rules under which banks calculate capital 
adequacy requirements and dispose of nonperforming loans.  Banks’ voice in corporate 
governance no longer accords with the needs of an economy as advanced as Japan has 
become.  A  hermetic seal preventing further bank influence over the corporate 
governance of solvent Japanese firms is in order.  Japan’s banks need to be pure banks – 
they can no longer moonlight as guardians of corporate governance, for they are no 
longer qualified for what that job has become.  The banking system needs to be purified, 
not just cleaned up.   
  The  forceful voice Japan’s system of corporate governance accorded its major 
banks encourages a degree of risk avoidance inimical to entrepreneurial success, a bias 
towards investments in tangible, collateralizable assets that leaves innovation 
underfunded, and a bias towards short-term investments and short term solutions to 
financial problems.   
                                                                 
7 Capital market power is not unique to Japan.  It seemingly quite commonplace in developed and 
developing countries – see e.g. Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Morck, 
Wolfenzohn, and Yeung (2005), and others.        38 
One option for institutional reform is to revisit the Anglo-American system of 
shareholder primacy in corporate governance foisted upon Japan by the American 
occupation authorities in the immediate postwar period.  John et al. (2005) link stronger 
protection for shareholder rights to greater corporate risk taking.  Claessens and Klapper 
(2003) report higher bankruptcy rates in market oriented economies, suggesting that 
shareholder primacy in corporate governance permits more risk taking.  But Japanese 
corporate executives and bankers found that system distasteful in the 1950s and early 
1960s, and actively undermined it.  Perhaps tastes have changed.   
  But Anglo-American shareholder primacy is clearly not the only option.  Other 
countries that grant banks loud voices in corporate governance, such as Germany, 
confront analogous problems.  Germany’s handful of major banks control most large 
firms’ shareholder meetings through their proxy voting powers.  Germany’s largest firms 
have held to tried and true techniques and done acceptably well for decades.   
  Fohlin (2005) argues that family controlled firms are much more important, and 
banks less important, in Germany that generally realized.  Family control too entails 
governance problems, but the controlling family – unlike a creditor – benefits primarily 
from raising the share price and so tolerates a degree of risk a bank would prefer to avoid.    
Kleeberg (1987), Fohlin (2005) and others argue that banks’ role in the g overnance of 
large German firms was not always beneficial, or even benign.  Franzke, Grobs, and Laux 
(2001) argue that  banks actively subverted financial development in Germany.  For 
example, they argue that the paucity of IPOs in Germany in part reflects banks’ lobbying 
of stock exchanges to prevent the rise of competitors to their existing client firms.     39 
  La Porta et al. (1999) show that family controlled corporate groups, similar to 
Japan’s great prewar zaibatsu, remain the predominant form of corporate organization in 
most countries at all stages of economic development.  Morck, Yeung, and Stangeland 
(2000) argue that these structures are vulnerable to a range of corporate governance 
problems, and that these may sometimes reach macroeconomic proportions.  Morck, 
Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) present a survey o f the  microeconomic and 
macroeconomic resource allocation problems inherent in concentrated control of  a 
country’s corporate sector in modern countries with zaibatsu-like corporate governance 
arrangements.     
Japan need not follow the Anglo-American model of large widely-held firms 
whose  controversially highly paid  managers are disciplined by  equally controversial 
corporate raiders and activist pension funds.  Family firms might do the trick.  But 
modern Japan is an intensely egalitarian society (Kitamura, Suto, and Teranishi; 2004). 
The inequality in economic power inherent in a Western European style economy of old 
money  family  corporate empires might arouse  unacceptable  memories of the prewar 
zaibatsu, which were organized along those lines.   
Japan’s past success at domesticating foreign institutions makes it likely  Japan 
will find its own solution.  Perhaps a Japanese system of widely held firms with modestly 
paid professional managers disciplined by equally modestly paid pension fund managers 
might emerge as another Japanese model for other nations.   It’s too soon to tell.   
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8.  Conclusions 
Japan is justly seen as a role model for other countries.  It is the first large country outside 
the Western world to join the ranks of the world’s richest countries. The institutional 
development that let it do so is unique in the world, and worthy of study for purely 
academic reasons as well as practical ones.   
  We argue that the institutional innovations normally associated with Japan – it’s 
corporations’ heavy reliance on bank financing and its great banks’ involvement in their 
client firms’ corporate governance  – probably were important to the country’s rapid 
postwar reconstruction in the mid 20
th century and to its rapid economic ascent in the 
1970s and 1980s.  “Catching up” entailed large scale low-risk investment in physical 
assets – precisely the sorts of investments best suited to bank financing.    
  Other countries in similar situations can learn from the Japanese experience.  
Countries recovering from wars, natural disasters, or other calamities that need to rebuild 
physical assets quickly should consider bank-centered governance and bank financing.  
Perhaps decades of totalitarian socialism count as  such a calamity, and transition 
economies might profit from the Japanese model.  An important caveat remains though, 
for Japan had already experienced high growth periods and had a modern corporate 
sector prior to World War II.  It clearly developed a range of institutions capable of 
sustaining a modern economy in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries.  Transition 
economies may well need those earlier institutions as well to follow the Japanese 
example.    
  However, the Japanese postwar experience is perhaps of more value as a negative 
example to countries in other situations.  Certainly, many in 21
st century Japan no longer   41 
finds this system adequate and seems likely to move on to governance models that entrust 
less power to banks (Hanazaki  and Horiuchi, 2000, 2001, 2003).  We have presented 
detailed explanations about why banks are ill equipped either to finance or to monitor the 
governance of firms whose assets are largely intangibles – ideas, software, and the like.  
Indeed, we have explained how banks are likely to try to avoid risks of the sort they 
normally avoid, and in doing so, misdirect capital in ways that undermine the 
macroeconomy and ultimately the stability to the banking system itself.    
  If Japan’s postwar experience is of limited value to developed economies, what of 
emerging markets.  Most developing economies are not reconstructing the physical 
infrastructure of their corporate sectors, but rather trying to develop modern economies 
for the first time.  Japan’s initial high growth phase, prior to World War I, occurred under 
markedly different institutions from those prevailing after World War II.   That earlier 
period  might be a more valuable source of inspiration to policy makers in emerging 
economies seeking a Japanese model.  Still, Japan’s lost decade serves as a warning to 
other countries about the loss in economic versatility and agility that governance models 
of this sort can induce if they become overly entrenched.  
  This is no criticism of Japan.  Every extant corporate governance system has 
problems.  The dot.com bubble in the United States shows that country’s stock market 
based system to have its own set of problems. The weakness, or in some occasions, the 
outright absence, of high tech sectors in many European countries demonstrates that the 
zaibatsu-like systems still commonplace there fair perhaps even worse. As developed 
nations everywhere, including Japan, move forward with further institutional reforms and   42 
experiments, it seems unlikely that future developments will give banks the sorts of 
power they wielded in postwar Japan.    
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